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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST-CLAYTON ACT-MONOPOLIES-The

United States Supreme Court has held that in order
to seek injunctive relief under the Clayton Act a
private plaintiff must allege threatened loss or
damage of the type antitrust laws were designed to
prevent; loss of profits that plaintiff would sustain
due to possible price competition following merger
was not antitrust injury necessary to enjoin merger
under Clayton Act.

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 484 (1986).
On June 17, 1983 Excel Corporation (Excel), the nation's second
largest meat packer, signed an agreement to acquire Spencer Beef,
the third largest meat packer.' The proposed acquisition would enable

Excel to command a market share nearly equal to that of the largest
meat packer, IBP, Inc. (IBP). 2 Monfort of Colorado, Inc. (Monfort),
the nation's fifth largest meat packer 3 sought to enjoin the proposed

merger by bringing an action under section 16 of the Clayton Act,

1. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 487 (1986).
Defendant-petitioner Excel owns and operates five integrated beef packing plants
and one fabrication plant while Spencer Beef owns two integrated plants and one
slaughtering plant. Excel is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cargill, Inc., the other
defendant below, and Spencer Beef is a division of the Land O'Lakes agricultural
cooperative. Defendants operate in both the market for fed cattle (the input market)
and the market for fabricated beef (the output market). Id.
2. Id. at 487 note 2. The district court determined market share based on
the testimony of one of the plaintiff-respondent's witnesses who stated: "Monfort's
share of the cattle slaughter market was 5.5%, Excel's share was 13.3%, and IBP's
was 24.4%. Monfort's share of the production market was 5.7%, Excel's share was
14.1%, and IBP's share was 27.3%. After the merger Excel would have a 20.4%
share of each market." Id.
3. Id. at 487. Plaintiff-respondent Monfort owns and operates three integrated beef packing plants. Id.
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15 U.S.C. § 26. 4 Monfort contended that the proposed merger would
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act5 and would impair its ability to
6

compete.

Excel moved for involuntary dismissaF contending that Monfort
did not allege or demonstrate that it would suffer antitrust injury as
defined in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-Q-Mat, Inc." The District
Court for the District of Colorado denied the motion and issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order enjoining the proposed merger. 9
The court held that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 10 Because Monfort had shown the merger would cause a profit
squeeze which would reduce its profits," the allegation was one of
anti-trust injury.'2
4. Id. at 487. Section 16 of the Clayton Act states:
"Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws, including section 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and
under the same conditions and principles as against threatened conduct that
will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules
governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against
damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the
danger of irreparable loss or dainge is immediate, a preliminary injunction
may issue: Provided,that nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle
any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States, to
bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject
to the provisions of subtitle IV of title 49, in respect of any matter subject
to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. In any action under this section in which the plaintiff substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, to such plaintiff." 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976)
5. 107 S. Ct. at 488.
6. Id. at 488 note 4. Section 7 prohibits mergers when "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." Id. quoting the Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1980).
Monfort alleged that the proposed acquisition would result in a concentration
of economic power in the various markets thus threatening its supply of fed cattle
and its ability to compete in the boxed beef market. 107 S. Ct. at 488.
7. Id. at 488. The district court consolidated the motion for a preliminary
injunction with a full trial on the merits. Id.
8. Id. at 488. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477 (1977), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs seeking damages under section 4
of the Clayton Act must go beyond mere proof of an "injury causally linked" to
a particular merger. Plaintiff is required to prove anti-trust injury which is defined
as "injury of the type the anti-trust laws are intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes the defendant's act unlawful." 429 U.S. at 489.
9. 107 S. Ct. at 488.
10.

Id.

11. Id. at 488, quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. at 709-10.
12. 107 S. Ct. at 488, quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,
591 F. Supp. at 691-92.
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Excel subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit,13 where the judgment was affirmed in all respects.' 4 The

5
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'

Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, 6 began by
addressing the issue of whether "a private plaintiff seeking injunction
under section 16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust
injury.17 Justice Brennan first looked to a related provision of the
Clayton Act, section 4,18 which also provides a mechanism for private
enforcement of antitrust laws. 19 Under this related section, the Court
in Brunswick held that a plaintiff must prove antitrust injury which

is more than simply an injury causally linked to a particular merger.20
Brennan's analysis reaffirmed the validity of "the Brunswick test"
2
in determining whether a plaintiff has alleged antitrust injury. '
Justice Brennan then expressed the Supreme Court's concurrence
with the lower court decisions that, under both section 16 and section

4 of the Clayton Act,22 a plaintiff must allege an injury of the type
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. 23 To this end, Brennan
analyzed the legal theories advanced by Monfort to determine whether
its alleged threatened injuries resulting from the proposed merger

constituted a threat of antitrust injury.24
The first theory of injury advanced by Monfort related to the

theory that Excel would lower its prices after the merger to some

13. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985).
14. Id. The court of appeals considered Monfort's allegation of a subsequent
price-cost squeeze to be an allegation of predatory pricing and not merely an
allegation of losses due to vigorous competition. 761 F.2d at 575.
15. Cert. granted, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 474 U.S. at _
106 S. Ct. 784 (1985).
16. 107 S. Ct. at 486. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Marshall, Powell, O'Connor and Scalia. Justices Stevens and
White filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of
the case. Id.
17. 107 S.Ct. at 488.
18. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
19. Id. Section 4 of the Clayton Act states: "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor in any district court of the United States...

,

and shall recover

threefold the damages he sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 107 S.Ct. at 488-89, quoting the Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982).
20. 107 S.Ct. at 492 note 11.
21. 107 S.Ct. at 489.
22. See supra notes 4, 19.
23. Id. In his analysis, Brennan compared the language of section 16 to
section 4 and also consulted Congressional records.
24. Id. at 491.
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level at or slightly above its cost due to increased efficiency.25 Monfort
contended this would force it to lower its prices to remain a viable
competitor, thus leading to a loss of profits. 26 Justice Brennan simply
looked to the Brunswick27 case as rejecting the threat of loss of
profits due to possible post-merger price competition as a "threat of
antitrust injury.''28 As in Brunswick, it was held that economic loss
from increased market share competition does not constitute injury
29
that is redressable under the antitrust laws.
The second theory of injury analyzed by Justice Brennan was that
Excel would attempt to drive Monfort out of business after the
merger through the practice of predatory pricing. 0 Because the court
of appeals failed to state its definition of predatory pricing, Justice
Brennan offered two possible interpretations. 3 1 Under the first interpretation, where Monfort's allegation of loss of profits from the
post-merger lowering of prices constituted an allegation of injury
from predatory conduct, Justice Brennan declared the lower court's
judgment to be clearly erroneous as: (a) Monfort did not allege that
Excel would act with predatory intent after the merger, and (b)
32
because pricing competition does not constitute predatory activity.
Justice Brennan's second interpretation of the court of appeals definition of predatory pricing was that Monfort had demonstrated a
plausible threat of injury as a result of Excel's post-merger belowcost pricing. 33 The opinion held that under this interpretation the
judgment must be reversed because Monfort did not allege any injury
from below-cost pricing before the district court.3 4 The majority did,

25.

Id.

26. Id. at 492. Under this theory, Monfort did not allege that it would be
driven out of business. Id.
27. Id. The Court stated Brunswick held that the antitrust laws protect
businesses from the loss of profits, but only if said losses result from practices
prohibited by the antitrust laws. Id.
28. Id. at 492-93.
29.

Id.

30. Id. at 493. The Court defined predatory pricing as "pricing below an
appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short
run and reducing competition in the long run." However, in a footnote, the Court
noted there is no consensus on the proper definition of predatory pricing in the
antitrust context. Id. at 493 note 12.
31. Id. at 493.
32.

Id.

33. Id. at 494.
34. Id. The district court stated that Monfort made no assertion that Excel
would engage in predatory pricing. Id. at 494 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colorado, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 691, 710).
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however, reject the adoption of a per se rule denying standing to
competitors seeking to challenge acquisitions on the basis of predatory
pricing theories."
Finally, Justice Brennan held that, because the record below failed
to support a finding of antitrust injury and therefore failed to satisfy
the requirement of section 16 of the Clayton Act, the question of
36
whether the proposed merger violates section 7 need not be reached.
The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case was
37
remanded.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, filed a dissenting opinion
which focused on the policies behind the enactment of the Clayton
Act and its later amendments. 38 The dissent contended that the
majority decision ignored the language and history of section 7 of
the Clayton Act and its broad scope for injunctive relief, instead
basing its decision solely on the Brunswick case and its construction
of the private damages actions of the Act. 39 Justice Stevens argued
that the broad scope of the language in section 7 and section 16 of
the Clayton Act mandates that the standing requirement for plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief be only a demonstration of threatened injury. 40 The dissent declared a Brunswick type of analysis was not
applicable to this type of section 16 action because the notion of an
antitrust injury is not an element of a cause of action for injunctive
relief which is dependent on a showing of only a reasonable threat. 41
Justice Stevens simply stated if the merger was illegal, as the lower
courts held, it should be set aside. 42 The dissent reasoned that the
majority opinion effectively denied relief to any private party for a
43
violation which was clearly defined in the statute.
Because the Cargilldecision was based on federal antitrust statutes,
a brief history of the pertinent provisions of the Clayton Act is
requird to place the Court's decision in perspective. An illustration
of sections 4, 7, and 16 of the Act should be helpful in understanding
the policy and analysis of Cargill.44
35. 107 S. Ct. at 495 (citing Brief for United States as Arnicus Curiae at 10).
The United States supported this per se rule in its Amicus Curiae brief. Id.
36. 107 S. Ct. at 495.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 498-99.
Id.at 499.
Id.
See supra notes 4, 6, 17.
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Prior to the 1914 enactment of the Clayton Act, private parties
were generally barred from filing lawsuits under the antitrust laws
to restrain or prevent violations of such laws .45The
passage into law
of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act effected a radical change in
national antitrust policy by providing private parties with a statutory
46
vehicle for commencing actions under the antitrust laws.
A typical early action under section 16 of the Clayton Act reached
the Supreme Court in 1927 in Bedford Cut Stone Company v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association of North America.47 The
Court in Bedford granted the plaintiff's motion for an injunction
dissolving a union labor combination despite the fact there was no
proof of actual injury. The injunction was granted merely upon a
48
showing of a "dangerous probability" of future antitrust injury.
In contrast to the section 16 action in Bedford, a 1943 case, Beegle
v. Thompson illustrates the much more rigorous standards to which
section 4 actions have historically been subjected. 4 9 The private plaintiff in Beegle was denied relief because of a failure to allege specific
damages to his business resulting from the defendant's violation of
the antitrust laws- 0 Despite the requirement of proving actual damages in section 16 actions, and the fact that standing requirements
have generally been much more stringent under that section, antitrust
law has developed with a clear relationship of policy and analysis
evident between sections 4 and 16. 51
Private and governmental actions to remedy or enjoin anticompetitive or monopolistic corporate mergers were very limited prior to
the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act.52 Section 7 of the Act as

45.

See generally Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 542, 550-

51(1902).
46. See supra notes 4, 17.

47.

274 U.S. 37 (1927).

48.

Id. at 54.

49. 138 F. 2d 875 (7th Cir. 1943).
50. Id. at 881. The circuit court reiterated that there must be a direct
relationship between the alleged antitrust violation and the specific injury suffered
by the plaintiff in a section 4 action. Id.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Company, 347 U.S. 514 (1954). In
Borden, the Supreme Court employed the section 4 analysis of Beegle in a section
16 case. The Borden Court categorized both sections 4 and 16 as supplements to
governmental enforcement of the antitrust laws, which may only be used when the
private plaintiff's personal interest will be served in addition to that of the general
public. Id. at 518.
52. See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) for
an excellent history of the Clayton Act including the 1950 amendment. Id. at 31123.

1987]

RECENT DECISION

enacted in 1914 prohibited only the monopolistic acquisition by one
corporation of the stock of another corporation and then, only if
the businesses were direct competitors.53 Obviously, any private actions under section 4 or 16 alleging violations of section 7 were
likewise limited. The 1950 amendments to section 7 made it unlawful
for one corporation to acquire the stock or assets of another corporation if the effect was to lessen competition or create a monopoly.54 In addition, the requirement that the merging firms be direct
competitors was also eliminated. 5 This landmark amendment paved
the way for the significant private and governmental anti-merger
antitrust actions of the modern era. However, it was not until 1984
that the federal courts addressed the issues raised in a section 16
action brought by a competitor seeking to enjoin another competitor's
horizontal merger or joint venture with a third competitor in an
56
oligopolistic market.
57
The first such action, Chrysler Corporation v. General Motors
was a section 16 action brought by the Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler) seeking injunctive relief to prevent a proposed joint venture
between General Motors Corporation (GM) and Toyota Motor Corporation.5 8 The complaint contained eight theories of injury supporting the allegation that the joint venture would tend to create a
monopoly in violation of section 7.59 The Federal Trade Commission
0
(FTC) had already approved a modified plan for the joint venture
53. Id. at 312-13.

54. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950 reads in pertinent
part:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commence in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1980)
55. See supra note 48. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962). The Brown Shoe Court discusses the specific changes to section 7 of
the Clayton Act as amended in 1950 which removed any requirement that section 7
only be applied to direct competitors. Id. at 317.
56. Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C.
1984).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1184.
59. Id. at 1189-90. The eight theories of injury alleged by Chrysler were
generally allegations of the future anticompetitiveness resulting from the proposed
joint venture. Id.
60. Id. at 1184. The modified plan for the joint venture was approved by
the Federal Trade Commission by a vote of 3-2. Id.
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GM motioned for the complaint to be dismissed under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted as Chrysler lacked standing to bring the action
and the motion was denied. 6' The District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the plaintiff had standing to bring the action. 62
In assessing the eight theories of injury alleged by Chrysler, the court
recognized that the plaintiff, to achieve standing under section 16,
must show a threat of loss or injury proximately resulting from the
antitrust violation. 63 The analysis of the specific theories of injury
was very general, and GM's argument that standing be denied because
plaintiff was only complaining about increased competition was summarily dismissed. 64 The district court did not engage in a Brunswick
analysis despite its acceptance of the defendant's contention that the
Brunswick standard must be applied in section 16 actions as established in Schoenkopf v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp.65 The
Chrysler decision was largely based upon the fact that the joint
venture partners were the first and third largest automobile companies
in the world and that the sheer size and market power of these two
competitors would cause a tendency toward monopoly.6
In the second such case, Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co.,67 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's granting of a preliminary injunction
preventing a proposed acquisition of Pabst Brewing Company by G.
Heileman Brewing Company, Inc. 68 The plaintiff-appellees, Christian
Schmidt Brewing Company (Schmidt) and Stroh Brewing Company,
brought the section 16 action alleging violations of section 7 due to
the proposed merger's probable lessening of competition for malt
beverages in a twelve-state upper Midwest market. 69 The court rejected

61.
62.

Id.
Id.

63. Id.at 1188.
64. Id. at 1192-94.
65. 637 F.2d 205 (3rd Cir. 1980). The circuit court in Schoenkopf merely
applied a Brunswick rule to a section 16 action. 589 F. Supp. at 1191.
The Chrysler court refused to undertake a Brunswick analysis as was done in
Schoenkopf. The court chose to focus its analysis on cases involving section 16
allegations. Id. at 1192.
66. 589 F. Supp. at 1193. The district court accepted, without explanation.
Chrysler's allegation that its injury derived from the fact the joint venture parents
were the first and third largest automobile companies in the world. Id.
67. 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985).
68. Id. at 1355.
69. 753 F.2d at 1356.
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appellant's arguments that the proposed merger would actually increase competition, and any price increases would inure to the benefit
of the appellees. 70 Standing requirements were held fulfilled under a
71
Brunswick analysis because the appellees had alleged antitrust injury.
The probable antitrust injury as seen by the court was the impairment
of appellee Schmidt's ability to wholesale and distribute their products
which would result from the elimination of competition between the
appellants, and would ultimately threaten Schmidt's ability to survive
in an "industry of giants. ' 72 The court clearly stated the alleged
antitrust injury would not be sufficient if it resulted from increased
post-merger efficiencies but it found a more predatory and anticom73
petitive consequence to be threatened.
4
A third case, White Consolidated Industries v. Whirlpool Corp.
was a consolidation of separate section 16 actions brought by White
Consolidated Industries and Magic Chef, Inc.7 5 The actions were
brought to permanently enjoin Whirlpool Corporation and Emerson
Electric Company from acquiring Kitchenaid, a division of Hobart
Corporation.7 6 All parties were engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling household appliances.77 In granting the plaintiffs
a preliminary injunction, the district court undertook a detailed
analysis of pre- and post-merger market concentration and concluded
that the defendants had failed to overcome plaintiffs' prima facie
case that the transaction was illegal.7 8 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that the defendants would engage in repeated, illegal,
anticompetitive behavior, such as predation and collusion, as being
,7

70. Id. at 1356-57.
71.

Id. at 1357.

72. Id. The court of appeals found the alleged injury to be "exactly the sort
of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent." Id. at 1351 note 5.
73.

Id.

74.

612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio 1985), vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D.

Ohio 1985).
75. Id. at 1011-12.
76. Id. at 1012.
77. Id. at 1013-14.

78. Id. at 1019-30. The finding of a prima facie case that the proposed
transaction was illegal was based on comparison of pre- and post-merger market
concentrations as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is
calculated by summing the squares of the percentage of market share held by each
of the firms in the market. Pre- and post-merger HHI's are subjected to various
tests to determine the likelihood of a lessening of competition. The process is not
standardized and the results must be weighed with other relevant factors. Id. at
1020.
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too speculative to be believed. 79 As in the Chrysler and Christian
Schmidt cases, little attention was paid to the defendants' argument
that the merger would actually increase competition. 0 Again, the
court seemed to disfavor the merger due to perceived post-merger
market power, although analysis relating to the actual post-merger
antitrust injury to the plaintiffs was lacking. 81 The opinion failed to
recognize the Brunswick standard for alleging antitrust injury. s2 The
granting of the preliminary injunction was tantamount to allowing
the plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general.83
The Supreme Court in the principal case generally ignored the

three previously discussed cases and based its decision almost entirely
on the Brunswick rule which it formulated in 1977.84 The so-called
Brunswick rule is simply a rule designed to ensure that a private
plaintiff in an antitrust action be restricted to remedying personal
injuries flowing from an antitrust violation, thereby preventing attempts by private plaintiffs to enforce the antitrust laws in a general
sense.85 The Brunswick Court was very clear in enunciating the
requirement that the injury alleged in a private antitrust action must
relate to the antitrust violation. 6 The plaintiffs in Brunswick listed
as damages a loss of profits due to the defendant's acquisition of
failing bowling centers. 7 The plaintiffs contended they were denied
larger market shares which they would have had if the struggling

79. Id. at 1019.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court made no attempt to relate the post-merger market power
of Whirlpool to the allegations of injury. Id. at 1019.
The court focused its analysis solely on the question whether Whirlpool's postmerger market power would be "inherently anti-competitive." Id. at 1027.
82. The district court merely applied the traditional analysis governing the
issuance of a preliminary injunction and related this to the alleged threatened
antitrust injury. Id. at 1030.
83. By ignoring the Brunswick rule, the court, in effect, treated the case as
if brought by the United States as plaintiff. See generally United States v. Borden
Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1954), for a discussion of the appropriateness of private antitrust
actions versus governmental actions.
84. See generally Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484
(1986). The Court in Cargill did cite the Christian Schmidt decision in a footnote.
Id. at 490 note 7.
85. See supra note 8. See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
86. 429 U.S. at 487-89.
87. Id. at 481. The plaintiffs were three of the ten bowling centers owned
by a relatively small parent company. Defendant, although controlling only 2% of
the bowling centers in the United States, was the largest operator of bowling centers
with over five times as many centers as the second largest operator. Id. at 479-80.
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bowling centers failed.

8

The Supreme Court very carefully examined

the alleged injury, i.e., the loss of future income which would have
resulted if the bowling centers closed down. The Court related this
injury to the alleged antitrust violation which was the entrance of a
"deep pocket" parent company into a market of "pygmies." 8' 9 This
structured analysis led the Court to conclude that the plaintiffs'
injury was not of "the type that the statute was intended to forestall." 9 The opinion further observed that even if the plaintiffs were

injured "by reason of the unlawful acquisitions, they were not injured
by reason of that which made the acquisitions unlawful." 91 The
courts in the Chrysler, Christian Schmidt, and White cases did not

fully explore the relationship between the alleged injury and the
alleged antitrust violation as mandated by the Supreme Court in
92
Brunswick.
The Cargill decision became elementary for the Supreme Court

once it focused its analysis on the source of the injury of which
plaintiff Monfort was complaining. 93 The first theory of injury orig-

inated from increased competition, and this theory was quickly and
correctly rejected. 94 There was simply no threat of antitrust injury
given the fact that competition for increased market share is not
forbidden by the antitrust laws. 95 The second theory of injury, that

88. Id. at 481.
89. Id. at 487.
90. Id. at 487-88 (citing Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202
(1967)).
91. 429 U.S. at 488. The Brunswick Court was careful in isolating private
antitrust injury from a violation of the antitrust laws. An illegal presence in the
market, without a causal link to the private plaintiff's alleged injury, was held
insufficient to allow recovery. Id. at 488-89.
92. Of the three cases only the ChristianSchmidt court attempted a Brunswick
analysis of the alleged injury. In holding that the plaintiff alleged the necessary
antitrust injury, the Christian Schmidt court looked to the allegation that the
dominance of the merged corporation would induce distributors to drop smaller
brewers as customers. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,
753 F.2d 1354, 1357 (6th Cir. 1985).
See also White Consolidated Industries v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009
(N.D. Ohio 1985) where the court, although not engaging in a Brunswick analysis
of the alleged injury, rejected plaintiff's post-merger scenario which was similar to
the one accepted by the court in Christian Schmidt. The White court considered
such a scenario to be too speculative to be believed. 612 F. Supp. at 1019.
93. Cargill, 107 S.Ct. at 491. This was the first step in the Court's inquiry.
Although the complaint did not clearly state what the source of the alleged injury
was, the Court formulated two theories of alleged injury through a review of the
record below. Id.
94. Id. at 491-93.
95. Id. at 492-93.
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defendant would engage in post-merger predatory pricing, was dismissed because the allegation was never properly raised before the
district court. 96 The Court went on to reject the notion that it should
adopt a per se rule "denying standing to competitors who challenge
97
mergers and acquisitions on the basis of predatory pricing theories.
This was rejected for the simple reason that "predatory pricing is an
anticompetitive practice forbidden by the antitrust laws." 98 Despite
this seemingly stratightforward statement, it is this second theory of
injury that the Supreme Court has left open to speculation due to
its footnoted comments. 9 At least one legal scholar's reading of the
case is that Cargill has repealed section 16 of the Clayton Act as a
practical matter, thus preventing any private enforcement of the
section through injunctive action.1 °
It is clear that the Cargill decision makes it very unlikely for an
oligopolistic competitor to successfully enjoin a merger of two of its
competitors through a section 16 action alleging future predatory
behavior. The Supreme Court has already proclaimed that speculative
theories of antitrust injury weigh heavily against judicial enforcement
of the antitrust laws.' 0 Lower courts, such as in the previously
discussed White case, have demonstrated the ease with which allegations of post-merger predatory behavior can be rejected as being
too specualtive to be believed.10 2 The Cargill decision alludes to the
possibility that a successful section 16 allegation of post-merger
predatory behavior could be brought, but it fails to clearly state the
requirements for such an action. It appears that the successful
plaintiff would have to show that the post-merger defendant would
control at least sixty percent of the appropriate market, and that
significant barriers to entry into the market would exist after the
merged firm had eliminated some of its rivals. 10 3 The Court's analysis
and tone strongly hint that the burden placed on the plaintiff in

96. Id. at 494. The Court noted that the district court twice indicated that
Monfort made no assertion that Excel would engage in predatory pricing. Id.
97.

Id. at 495. See supra note 30.

98. 107 S. Ct. at 495. The Court stated that even though predatory pricing
is an infrequent occurrence there is simple evidence that it occurs. Id.
99. Id. at 494 note 15.
100. See Flynn, CURRENT TOPIC IN ANTITRUST: AN ANTITRUST ALLEGORY, 38 Hastings L.J. 517 (1987) for a scathing comment on the Cargill

decision and on the ideological constituency of the Supreme Court itself.
101. Associated General Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 543-45 (1983).
102. See supra notes 70, 82.
103. Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 494 note 15.
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such a case is all but impossible to meet." °4 The most obvious reading
of the holding is that plaintiffs will be denied standing in such
actions. Where all parties are participants in an oligopolistic market,
there appears to be no theory under which a plaintiff will be assured
standing in a section 16 action.'0°
The Cargilldecision suggests the Supreme Court may be frustrating
the intent of section 7 of the Clayton Act as it was meant to be
applied by private plaintiffs through section 4 and section 16 actions.
If the opinion does in fact lead to a future denial of the Congressionally guaranteed rights of private plaintiffs, then the Supreme
Court has crossed the line into the realm of "superlegislating".
Further development in this area of antitrust law will determine
whether Congressional intervention is necessary to clarify our evolving
national antitrust policies.
Anthony Tedesco

104. Id. at 494-95 notes 15-17.
105. In a non-oligopolistic market with many competitors of greatly varying
market share it is also likely, given Brunswick, that even small firms bringing section
16 actions would face an extremely heavy burden even though antitrust policy has
historically favored the small competitor. See supra note 46 and see generally
Brunwswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).

